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The lil/morn Case,
the MacGuffin, and the
Supreme Court
by Marianne Wesson
When Sallie Hillmon of Lawrence, Kansas, bade farewell to
her husband John in February 1879, she may have been feeling some apprehension about the errand he said he was undertaking-a winter trip by horse and wagon to find a good spot
further west where a man might start a sheep ranch.
But the 23-year-old waitress could not have anticipated that
John Hillmon's failure to return from this expedition would
provoke an epic lawsuit that would last for a generation and
produce six trials, two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court,
and a new rule in the law of evidence.
The litigation bearing her name, brought against the three
life insurance companies that had issued policies on John's
life, is remembered today chiefly because of the law it
created. In the course of disapproving the judge's exclusion
from the third trial of certain epistolary evidence-a young
man's letter to his sweetheart back home-the Supreme Court
created an important exception to the hearsay rule for expressions of the intentions of the speaker or writer. Litigators
certainly know the rule; it is now embodied in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(3) and corresponding exceptions recognized in
most other American jurisdictions. But the story behind the
case bears remembering as well.
In the spring of 1879, Sallie Hillmon filed claims against
policies totaling $25,000 that three New York insurance
companies had issued on the life of her husband, John; she
reported that he had died in a firearms accident in rural southwest Kansas. Life insurance fraud was common, if not rife, in
late-nineteenth-century America. The suspicious companies
refused to pay the claims, maintaining that John Hillmon was
not dead. In July of 1880, negotiations having broken down,
Sallie commenced lawsuits against them; the three suits were
eventually consolidated into one.
The first two Hillmon trials, in 1882 and 1885, produced
Marianne(Mimi) Wesson is a law professor at the University of Colorado
School of Law in Boulder
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hung juries, but the third resulted in a victory for Sallie
Hillmon. It was this verdict, rendered in 1888, that led to the
famous Supreme Court decision of 1892, reversing the judgment in her favor. Three more trials ensued, two ending with
hung juries and the last in another verdict for Sallie Hillmon,
which was once again overturned by the Supreme Court. The
ultimate contested factual issue in all of the trials was the
identity of the man who died of a gunshot wound in March
1879 at a campsite near Medicine Lodge, Kansas, whose
death far predated the availability of twentieth-century methods of identification. Sallie Hillmon and her attorneys insisted
that the corpse was her husband's; supportive evidence
included identification of the body shortly after its demise by
Sallie Hillmon and by many others who had known him, as
well as early statements by Hillmon's traveling companion at
the time, John H. Brown. In Brown's original account, given
within hours of the death, he said he had shot Hillmon accidentally when unloading a rifle from a wagon while the two
men were making camp at a place called Crooked Creek.
The insurance companies argued that the deceased was not
Hillmon but an innocent victim, a man whom they claimed
Hillmon and Brown had lured to Crooked Creek for the precise purpose of killing him and leaving his body to pass as
Hillmon's. There also was some evidence that this was the
case, including witnesses who had known Hillmon in life and
swore that the body (or a photograph of it) could not have
been Hillmon, and a written statement sworn to by John H.
Brown a few months later, after a coroner's inquest had concluded that the dead man was not Hillmon. In this statement,
Brown supported the companies' theory and said that the
victim was an individual named "Joe" whom he and Hillmon
had picked up in Wichita and persuaded to accompany them
west. But before the first trial, John Brown repudiated this
story and returned to his original one, claiming that the insurance company's lawyers had coerced him into signing the
false affidavit.

Volume 32 Number I

At the time of the first trial, the defendant insurance
companies claimed that the corpse was that of Frederick
Adolph Walters, once a citizen of Ft. Madison, Iowa, and the
betrothed of Alvina Kasten, also of Ft. Madison. They
produced witnesses, including Kasten and various Walters
family members who identified the corpse from photographs
as Frederick Walters's. It was agreed that young Walters had
left Ft. Madison in March of 1878 for the purpose of bettering
his condition and had traveled widely in the Midwest for a
year or so. The insurance companies claimed that Walters
found himself in Wichita in March of 1879, and it is here
that a letter-the document a film theorist might call the
MacGuffin-first makes its appearance.
Kasten testified in a pretrial deposition that she had received
a letter from her fianc6 dated March 1, from Wichita; in it he
wrote that he planned to leave that city soon with a "man by
the name of Hillmon," a sheep trader. The letter, which was
attached to the Kasten deposition transcript as an exhibit,
explained the writer's decision to accompany this stranger by
confiding that Hillmon had "promised me more wages than I
could make at anything else." Kasten described this letter as
the last communication she had enjoyed from Walters.
This letter was exceedingly helpful to the defense, both in
suggesting an alternative identity for the corpse and in corroborating Brown's statement that he and Hillmon had lured a victim
to accompany them on their journey. It's difficult for any reader
of the Supreme Court's 1892 decision to resist the conviction,
aroused by Justice Gray's description of the letter, that the
Crooked Creek corpse must have belonged to Frederick Adolph
Walters. John Brown's conflicting accounts might cancel each
other out and leave one in doubt, as might various witnesses'
LITIGATION Fall 2005

identification of the corpse as Hillmon or Walters, but the letter
is a decisive tiebreaker. It is insupportable as coincidence that
Walters encountered a man named Hillmon in Wichita shortly
before the death at the campground, left that town with him, and
was never heard from again; murder is the obvious explanation.
Most students and scholars of the case, not only in this country
but abroad as well, believe that the corpse was that of Walters.
Still, the first two juries were unconvinced, or at least
enough of the jurors to produce two mistrials. But in the third
trial, Judge Shiras of the circuit court in Topeka excluded the
Kasten letter from evidence, accepting the arguments of
Sallie Hillmon's lawyers that it was inadmissible hearsay.
The jury, innocent of any knowledge of the letter, returned a
verdict for her, and the insurance companies appealed. The
Supreme Court's decision overturning that verdict contains its
famous language about what has become known as the "state
of mind" exception to the hearsay rule:

31

A man's state of mind or feeling can only be manifested
to others by countenance, attitude, or gesture, or by
sounds or words, spoken or written. The nature of the
fact to be proved is the same, and evidence of its proper
tokens is equally competent to prove it, whether
expressed by aspect or conduct, by voice or pen. When
the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying
an act, its connection with that act must be shown, in
order to warrant the admission of declarations of the
intention. But whenever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may
be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party ....
Volume 32 Number 1

The rule applicable to this case has been thus stated by
this court: "Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an
individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural reflexes of what
it might be impossible to show by other testimony. If
there be such other testimony, this may be necessary to
set the facts thus developed in their true light, and to give
them their proper effect. As independent, explanatory, or
corroborative evidence it is often indispensable to the
due administration of justice. Such declarations are
regarded as verbal acts, and are as competent as any
other testimony, when relevant to the issue. Their truth or
falsity is an inquiry for the jury.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1892),
quoting Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, 404-05 (1869).
With this reasoning, the Court reversed the trial judge and sent
the case back to be tried anew, directing that evidence of the
letter be allowed.
The Court's explanation is not really persuasive, however,
especially to a reader one century later. What could the Court
mean when it suggests that expressions of intention are
(at least sometimes) "verbal acts"? Today we reserve that
description for utterances that per se transform the legal situation of the speaker and/or another, for example, words of
gift, of contract, or of consent. It is characteristic of such locutions that they effect this transformation whether or not they
are "true"; they are not actually hearsay at all because they are
not offered to prove the truth of some matter asserted.
Descriptions of one's intention to go to a certain place are not,
ordinarily, in that category--certainly not when offered solely
as proof that one did go to that place. Such declarations would
be probative only if true-would be, that is, hearsay. The
Court spreads the confusion around a bit by borrowing from
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an earlier case the proposition that the "truth or falsity" of
statements like those in the letters is "an inquiry for the jury."
But the rule excluding hearsay, which the Court does not
purport to repeal in this case or any other, rests precisely on
the notion that determining the truth or falsity of some extrajudicial utterances is too challenging a task for a jury that has
been deprived of a chance to observe the declarant and hear
him cross-examined under oath.
There is yet another difficulty of the Court's opinion: Even
if, as the Court held, the letter was properly admissible to prove
that Walters intended to leave Wichita with Hillmon (and,
apparently, also for its tendency to prove that he did leave
Wichita with Hillmon), surely the letter's effect on the jury
could not be confined to proving those propositions. If accepted
as evidence of the truth of the propositions put forward by the
letter writer, the letters argued just as surely that Hillmon had
approached Walters in Wichita, promised him extraordinarily
(perhaps suspiciously) good wages for his company, and
intended to take Walters along when he and Brown decamped.
None of these latter propositions concerns Walters's intentions;
instead they describe either past events that the writer is recalling ("I met Hillmon and he promised me good wages") or the
perceived intentions of another ("Hillmon intends to take me
with him when he leaves Wichita"). Yet the Court did not
acknowledge that the rule it announced had already overrun its
premises.
What could account for the Court's unconvincing reasoning
and doubtful rulemaking in the Hillmon case? Even a modest
version of the hearsay exception for the expressed intentions
of a hearsay declarant-that is, a version allowing expressions
of intention to prove only the genuineness of the intentiondoes not rest on any plausible theory of reliability. It lacks any
justification in the sort of armchair psychology that prompted
the invention of, say, the exceptions for dying declarations or
statements against interest. The former were thought reliable
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because "no man would meet his Maker with a lie upon his
lips"; the latter because persons who say things that disadvantage them must be motivated by a powerful need to tell the
truth. But expressions of one's intentions?It would seem to be
easier to lie about one's intentions than about nearly anything
else, since the likelihood of being caught out in a lie is smallany discovery of later acts incompatible with the expressed
intention can always be explained by the simple phrase "I
changed my mind." The more robust version of the exception
endorsed by the Hillmon Court is even less grounded in reliability, since allowing an expression of intention as evidence
that the intention was accomplished disregards the folk
wisdom that there is "many a slip 'twixt cup and lip."
There is something more powerful than conventional
legal reasoning at work here: the urge to complete a just and
intelligible narrative. It is impossible to come away from an
encounter with the Supreme Court's opinion without the
impression that the trial judge's exclusion of the evidence
concerning Walters's letter-the story's MacGuffindisserved the cause of truth. The letter, although barred from
the jurors' notice in the third trial, was part of the appellate
record and was minutely described in the Court's opinion.
Once a reader of the Court's opinion knows of the letter,
it seems offensive to the idea of justice that the law would
countenance a retrial in which the verdict could rest again on
the jurors' ignorance of evidence that seemed to prove, with
near certainty, that the corpse belonged to Frederick Adolph
Walters. The story, the true story, had to be the one that Brown
told in his affidavit: Hillmon persuaded the credulous "Joe"
(obviously, from the evidence of the letters, Frederick Adolph
Walters) to accompany them on their journey and killed him
at Crooked Creek, leaving his body to be taken for Hillmon's.
If the reader is left with this narrative anxiety about the availability of the indispensable MacGuffin, can the Court have
been unmoved by the corresponding need to participate in the
creation of an acceptable story-a story in which truth and
justice are served in the end, rather than mocked?
Once invented, the Hillmon exception to the hearsay rule has
carried enough prestige to fend off serious criticism for more
than a century. Although later commentators raised doubts
about the rule of Hillmon, especially the expansive version, its
holding was incorporated 83 years after its announcement into
Federal Rule 803(3). That rule reads (in pertinent part):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness: ... A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed ....
By itself (especially in light of the qualification of the last
phrase), this rule might be read to exclude such materials as
the Walters letter, or at least to require strict confinement of
use of the material to proving the intentions of the declarant,
and prohibition of its use to proving past acts or another's
intentions. But on the whole, it has not been read that way, in
part because the influential Advisory Committee's Note to that
rule states: "The rule of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,
... allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the
doing of the act intended is, of course, left undisturbed."
Since the Hillmon decision itself seemed to permit all uses
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of the Walters letter, it is with some justification that most
judges have accepted the case to mean that a declaration of the
speaker's intentions is admissible over a hearsay objection,
even if it includes assertions about past conduct of the speaker
or another, and even if it contains a claim about the intentions
of someone else. This doctrinal result grows largely out of
reverence for the rule of Hillmon-and because the disputed
evidence in Hilimon itself described not only the intentions of
the declarant Walters but that declarant's claims about the past
acts and intentions of another, Hillmon.
The power that this single letter seemed to hold over
the development of the law of evidence eventually led
my curiosity in this direction: Suppose a case were to be
made for the truth of quite a different narrative, one in which
the corpse belongs to John Hillmon after all? In particular,
suppose that the story's MacGuffin, the famous letter, were
full of lies? What would this circumstance, if proven, bode for
the state-of-mind exception?
The possibility of any such plausible narrative may seem
small given the foregoing discussion, but that is in part
because the provenance of the Walters letter is taken for
granted; the lawyers' quarrel over its admissibility as hearsay
seems to exhaust skepticism about the circumstances of its
creation. And it is also in part because partisans of the defendants have played a suspiciously large role in constructing the
Hillmon story in historical memory.

The Hillmon exception
to the hearsay rule
has fended off serious
criticism for more
than a century.
Most persons familiar with the Hillmon case take their
understanding of it from the same source: a report written by
one of the attorneys for the insurance companies, who also
happened to be the state's insurance commissioner at the time.
Considering the bias that colored this canonical source, I concluded that the most instructive information about the Hillmon
case was to be found in contemporaneous newspaper accounts.
Putting aside the partisan arguments of the various newspapers, their more particular reports of the testimony and
evidence tell a rather clear story. After John Brown reported
the shooting death at Crooked Creek to some nearby rural
residents, two inquests were conducted under the auspices
of the coroner at Medicine Lodge, seat of Barbour County.
The first coroner's jury failed to agree whether the death was
accident or homicide; the second concluded that the shooting
was accidental. The body was then buried at Medicine Lodge,
and Brown wrote a letter to Sallie Hillmon explaining what
had happened and conveying his regret and condolences.
When the insurance companies that had issued policies on
Hillmon's life learned of the reported death of their policyholder, they lost no time moving into action. Agents of two of
the companies, Theodore Wiseman (sometimes known by the
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title "Major") and C. Tillinghast, traveled to Medicine Lodge
and demanded that the body be exhumed for their examination. They were accompanied by a Colonel Walker, apparently a figure of some renown in Kansas. The first two gentlemen told the Medicine Lodge coroner that they knew
Hillmon and wanted to assure themselves that he was the
deceased. According to a contemporaneous report in the
Medicine Lodge paper, the Cresset, "the identification was
satisfactory" and the body, presumptively Hillmon's, was
dispatched "to be returned to his relatives near Lawrence."
When the body reached Lawrence, however, far from being
returned to Sallie Hillmon or any other relative, it was delivered to two physicians described by the Lawrence Standardas
"representing the insurance companies." These physicians
were reported to be in doubt about whether the body, by then
nearly a month dead and partially decomposed, was that of
Hillmon. Three other persons who knew Hillmon were asked
to look at the exhumed body, and all said they could not be
certain whether or not it was Hillmon. Sallie Hillmon
declined at first to examine the body, saying she preferred to
remember her husband as he was in life, but later she did look
at it and affirmed that it was John Hillmon. The body was then
sent to a funeral home to be embalmed, although it was apparently taken out and shown to various persons during the ensuing days. The next day the coroner of Leavenworth County
summoned a coroner's jury and commenced a third inquest.
Despite citizens' grumblings about its justification, the
Lawrence inquest proceeded, an arduous affair of several
days. Many witnesses testified, including John Brown, who
gave the same account of an accidental shooting that he had
given at Medicine Lodge. Sallie Hillmon testified that she had
looked at the corpse after it was brought to Lawrence and
knew it for her husband's. Similar testimony about the
corpse's resemblance to Hillmon was given by Levi Baldwin,
Sallie's cousin and the erstwhile employer of John Hillmon,
who had gone to Medicine Lodge and accompanied the body
back to Lawrence. The proprietor of the rooming house where
the Hillmons lived also said he had seen the corpse and it was
Hillmon.

The letter and
the affidavit
seem to reinforce
each other.
It was mid-May when the coroner's jury returned its verdict
of murder "at the hands of John Brown." (Curiously, it did not
mention Hillmon as murderer or accomplice.) Brown must
have been feeling alarmed, but he was not immediately
accused, arrested, or charged. Instead, he was approached not
long afterward by a lawyer named W.J. Buchan. The lawyer
had several conversations with Brown during the summer,
beginning in May, and eventually spoke to Brown's brother as
well. In September, Brown signed and swore to a lengthy
statement, prepared by Buchan, repudiating the story he had
told about Hillmon's death and giving quite a different
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account. The statement averred that John Hillmon and Sallie
Hillmon's cousin Levi Baldwin had entered into a conspiracy
to commit insurance fraud; Baldwin's part was to pay the
premiums and Hillmon's (and Brown's) was to journey to the
Southwest to "find a subject to pass off as the body of John W.
Hillmon, for the purpose of obtaining the insurance money."
The affidavit said that after leaving Wichita, the two men had
encountered a stranger "the first day out of Wichita, about two
or two and one-half miles from town." The stranger "said his
name was either Berkley or Burgess, or something that
sounded like that," but Brown and Hillmon "always called
him Joe." Hillmon told Brown that Joe "would do for a subject to pass off for him," but Brown objected that murder was
"something that I had never before thought of, and was
beyond my grit entirely."
The statement then related that Hillmon shot and killed the
stranger at the Crooked Creek campground, dressed the dead
man in his clothes, put his own daybook into the jacket
pocket, told Brown to ride for assistance, and then vanished
north with "Joe's" valise. Later, back in Lawrence, according
to the statement, Brown had a conversation with Sallie
Hillmon in which she assured him that "she knew where
Hillmon was, and that he was all right."
From the insurance companies' point of view, a more
useful document than this affidavit can scarcely be imagined.
It accounts for all the facts then known, discredits not only
Brown's earlier testimony but that of two of the most important witnesses (Levi Baldwin and Sallie Hillmon) who identified the corpse as Hillmon, and makes excellent use of what
had before been the most suggestive circumstance in favor of
the company's position: the suspiciously large amount of life
insurance carried by a poor man like Hillmon.
Brown had also written (not just signed, as with the
affidavit) another highly helpful document: a letter to Sallie
Hillmon. In it he wrote, "I would like to know where John is, and
how that business is, and what I should do, if anything. Let me
know through my father. Yours truly, John H. Brown." Brown
later would say that Buchan had dictated this letter to him.
Sallie Hillmon testified that she did not receive this letter,
and Buchan admitted that he did not send it on to her; instead,
he gave it to the insurance companies' representatives. Apparently it was never intended as an actual communication;
it was a piece of evidence manufactured by Buchan, at a time
he purported to be representing Brown, in favor of the insurance companies' theory that Brown and Sallie Hillmon were
united in a continuing conspiracy. And by the time of the first
trial of the Hillmon case in 1882, Brown had returned to his
original account of the death at Crooked Creek, testifying for
Sallie Hillmon and claiming that Buchan and the insurance
companies had pressured him into swearing to the affidavit.
Apart from Brown's repudiated affidavit, the defendants
had little to rest their case on but claimed variations between
Hillmon's and the dead man's bodies, the oddness of a man
like Hillmon having purchased so much life insurance, and
the Walters letter. The letter and the affidavit (despite certain
discrepancies between them) seem to reinforce each other, the
one tending to quell doubts about the reliability of the other.
But if the Brown affidavit is dismissed as the product of the
interactions of an unscrupulous lawyer, a relentless set of
adversaries, and a frightened and unlettered young man, the
Walters evidence justly falls under new scrutiny, together
with the famous decision that legitimized it.
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The career of the letter through the various trials rewards
further attention. There was no evidence produced of the
letter at the Lawrence inquest, of course, because at that time
the insurance companies had not yet learned of Walters's
disappearance-or even of his existence. But after the
inquest, the insurance companies inquired throughout
the Midwest whether any families had suffered the recent
disappearance of a young man; it was through this technique
that they first learned of the Walters family and the missing
Frederick Adolph. Eventually they took the deposition of
Alvina Kasten, who (she said) furnished them with the
famous "Dearest Alvina" letter. Judge Foster, presiding in the
first trial, admitted the letter, together with the deposition in
which she identified it; Kasten herself did not testify live at
this trial (or any of the others). The judge kept the jurors in
session overnight on a Saturday, but after seven ballots the
jury remained divided 7-5 in favor of Sallie Hillmon, and a
mistrial was declared.
In the second trial, the Kasten deposition was again received
in evidence, together with the letter. Again the jury hung, this
time 6-6, but this time the letter seems to have been more
important in their deliberations. One juror (who had voted for
the plaintiff) suggested afterward to a newspaper reporter that
if Walters had been in Wichita, as the letter suggested,
he would certainly have been seen and remembered by
somebody. He would have had a boarding house; he
became a cigarmaker, he would certainly have been
remembered by someone of that craft. The fact that
there was no attempt to bring anyone forward, who
could say they had seen him in Wichita at that time,
caused us to believe that there was something crooked
about that letter.
Concerning Brown's two accounts, this juror said they "had
considerable influence, although it was hard to tell which of
his stories was true," and also that "it will be hard to make me
believe but what Buchan worked him pretty hard, to get his
evidence for the companies."
Apparently heeding this juror's skepticism, at the third trial
in 1888 the defendants called several witnesses to testify that
they had seen Walters, or someone who resembled him, in
Wichita in early March 1879. And again they offered the
Kasten deposition, together with its attached copy of the
letter she said Walters had sent her. But this new and revived
evidence availed the defendants little because Judge Shiras
forbade any mention of the contents of the letter, reasoning
that its assertions were hearsay (as they undeniably were).
The jury found unanimously for Sallie Hillmon. The letters, it
seems, had been essential to the insurance companies' earlier
modest success in staving off a loss; without them they could
not prevent a Hillmon victory. Of course it was this outcome
that gave rise to review of the case by the U.S. Supreme
Court, where the Court (per Justice Gray), after delivering its
famous opinion, remanded the matter to be tried yet again
before a jury fully apprised of the existence and content of the
Walters letter.
The three trials that ensued after the Supreme Court's 1892
decision produced outcomes that eerily replicated the first
three trials': two more hung juries, followed by a verdict for
Sallie Hillmon (destined to be overturned by the Supreme
Court when the litigation reached it for the second time). But
the letter, having by then enjoyed the Court's attention, under-
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went a more focused and searching scrutiny in the last three
trials than in the first two.
The fourth trial, which took place in Topeka in 1895, was
the longest, occupying nearly three months of the court's
time. On this occasion the insurance companies produced evidence that no previous jury had heard: Major Wiseman
testified for the first time that he had received a letter (not
produced) from the patriarch of the Walters family asking him
for help in locating a "lost son who wrote home last that he
was going west with a man by the name of Hillmon to herd
sheep for him."
Kasten's deposition and its accompanying letter had not, of
course, changed since it was admitted at the first trial. There
was another deposition witness who claimed to have been the
recipient of correspondence from Walters: H.S. Spreen of
Ft. Madison deposed that he had gotten a letter from Walters
dated Wichita, on March 5 or 6, informing Spreen that the
writer "was going west to herd sheep for a man." According to
Spreen, the business purpose of the letter, which was not produced, was to request a statement of Walters's account with
"the lodge" (apparently the Odd Fellows Lodge, of which
Walters was a member). Although Spreen had testified at the
first trial merely to say that Walters had a mole on his back and
that a picture (apparently of the corpse) "look[ed] a good deal
like Walters," this was the first mention of any letter Spreen
had received from him. And then there was a brother, C.R.
Walters, who at the time of Frederick Adolph's disappearance
lived in Missouri, who remembered (as he had in the first
trial) a letter he said he had received during February 1879,
postmarked Wichita. But his memory of this missing letter
had grown a bit more particular with time: This time he said
it related that his brother "had made arrangements to drive
cattle for a man by the name of Hillmon" in Colorado and
wished to postpone plans the two brothers had made to meet
and go to Leadville for the gold mining until after his engagement with Hillmon. This brotherly letter, like Spreen's, was
not produced, but another one was, by Sallie Hillmon's
lawyers: a letter that C.R. Walters had written to the sheriff of
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Leavenworth in 1880, after the inquest but before any of the
trials, stating that his brother Frederick Adolph had a gold filling in a tooth. This letter was inconvenient to the defendants
because their proof had been as adamant on the untouched perfection of the corpse's teeth as on any point in the litigation.
The jury in this trial hung, 11-1 in favor of Sallie Hillmon.
The fifth trial followed the fourth by a year; it began and
ended in March 1896. There were the Kasten deposition and

Heeley's testimony,
in retrospect,
seems altogether
dubious.
the familiar disagreements about resemblances and disparities
between the living Hillmon and the corpse, and evidence of
the contradictory accounts given by John Brown. There was
also a rather spectacular defense witness who was heard
in this trial for the first time, a Patrick Heeley of St. Louis.
Heeley testified that 17 years earlier, in the winter of 1879, he
had known Frederick Adolph Walters in Wichita-for about
two months prior to March 1 of that year. Walters worked for
him, said Heeley, helping sell railroad excursion tickets, and
the two men had seen each other at least once a day. On about
March 1 he saw Walters with another man whom Walters
introduced as John Hillmon; on a later occasion, he saw
Walters alone, and Walters said he was going with Hillmon to
start a cattle ranch. This testimony must have been very
impressive at the time, and seems not to have been much
impeached. But in retrospect it seems altogether dubious.
If Heeley had not been quite so certain of the two-month
duration of his acquaintance with Walters, and of having seen
him at least once every day in Wichita during that time, his
testimony might carry some historical weight. Unfortunately
for Heeley's credibility, at the sixth trial Frederick Adolph's
sister, Elizabeth Rieffenach, produced a letter from her
brother postmarked February 9, 1879, in Emporia, in part to
prove that its handwriting resembled that in the Kasten letter.
Its contents belie Heeley's testimony: Walters writes that he is
staying in that city (it was about 80 wintry miles from
Wichita) and had not had much employment recently. This
highly impeaching evidence was not known, however, to the
jurors of the fifth trial. They also hung, a majority of the jurors
apparently in favor of the defendants.
The sixth trial began in a manner that resembled the others
but offered several significant new revelations. Alvina Kasten
again did not testify, but her deposition and the letter
performed the same office they had in most of the earlier
trials, and several familiar witnesses from the earlier trials
appeared. There also was a surprise rebuttal witness for the
plaintiff, a man named Arthur Simmons, who owned a cigar
factory in Leavenworth.
Simmons testified that for three weeks in May of 1879that is, two months after the death at Crooked Creek-he had
employed Frederick Adolph Walters in his factory as a cigarmaker. Nor was his testimony the only proof of these events;
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Simmons produced records of employment corroborating this
claim. He knew the young man as F Walters, and he identified a photograph of the young Frederick Adolph as one of the
men who had made cigars for him. He testified that, even after
the intervening years, he had a good recollection of the young
cigarmaker because
[h]e was a man who was all the time talking to the men
about him and telling of his many travels. He had been in
a large number of towns in different places and he also
talked a great deal of his love scrapes and how he had
gotten out of them.
This testimony apparently made an impression on the sixth
jury, which returned a unanimous verdict for Sallie Hillmon.
Although the companies continued their appeals to higher
courts, and eventually succeeded in overturning this victory
as well in the Supreme Court, in the end they all settled with
her-nearly 25 years after the death at Crooked Creek.
But I have not forgotten that I undertook to persuade you
that the "Dearest Alvina" letter was a fake. Consider the testimony of Arthur Simmons. If this testimony was true (and no
reason appears that a cigar factory owner should have
perjured himself for Sallie Hillmon's sake, much less manufactured business records), then of course Walters did not
die at Crooked Creek. And if he did not, the same argument
against coincidence that made the "Dearest Alvina" letter
such convincing proof of his death at the hands of Hillmon
must be reconsidered-as an argument that the letter was
not genuine. Curiously, Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers do not seem
to have pursued the possibility that the letter was inauthentic,
perhaps because they had quietly investigated and, even
before Walters's sister produced a cache of old letters from
him in the sixth trial, had an opportunity to compare the
letter's handwriting with exemplars and concluded that the
letter was written by Walters. But that circumstance does not
necessarily imply that the letter was written when it is dated,
nor that the assertions in it are true.
Walters's long absence from home and failure to write to
his loved ones were circumstances too suggestive for the
defendant insurance companies not to make use of them. All
that was needed to transform the cigarmaker's disappearance
into strong proof that Hillmon had not died at Crooked Creek
was a document to tie Walters to the Crooked Creek corpse
and a witness to authenticate it. The Kasten letter and Alvina
Kasten satisfied these needs almost perfectly-if the letter
could be manufactured, and if she could be persuaded to
testify in a deposition that she had received the letter shortly
after the date that appeared on it.
The mind resists this last possibility because it requires us
to conclude that Alvina Kasten lied when she testified in her
deposition that she had received the letter on March 3, 1879.
We must also credit the insurance companies' agents and
lawyers with sufficient dishonesty to create a brazenly inauthentic document and suborn the perjury of these witnesses.
Can this rather extravagant hypothesis be supported? I believe
that it is not only supportable but nearly irresistible, and that
a narrative that accounts for all of the known facts must lead
us to the conclusion that the Kasten letter was not authenticat least not authentically a letter written when dated-and
further, that it makes many assertions that are not true.
We know that the lawyer Buchan, an attorney who eventually conceded that he worked for and was paid by the insur-
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ance companies, employed coercion to persuade John Brown
to sign the "Joe Burgess" affidavit, a document shown to be
false by the later testimony of Major Wiseman. We also know
that not long before Alvina Kasten gave her deposition
(the only occasion when she ever swore to her receipt of
the letter), Buchan dictated to John Brown the language of a
letter addressed to Sallie Hillmon-a letter suggesting that the
writer and the addressee were conspirators in a plot and that
John Hillmon was still alive. That there was never even any
pretense of actually mailing the letter to Mrs. Hillmon-that
Buchan sent it directly to the insurance company lawyerssuggests both the nakedness of Buchan's motive for having
Brown write it and the clumsiness of his methods. Buchan
was no stranger to the fabrication of evidence-epistolary
evidence-nor was he too scrupulous to pressure an individual
into swearing to propositions that were not true.
But if the defendants' lawyers were capable of such
chicanery as document fakery and subornation, what would
have induced such a respectable woman as Alvina Kasten and
various Walters family members to perjure themselves? As to
the Walters family, a possible explanation appears in a newspaper account of the second trial. The reporter concludes a
rendition of the day's testimony with the following:
It is not generally known that there was an insurance on
the life of young Walters, who is said to have been the
dead body taken to Lawrence and passed for the body of
Hillmon. A reporter for The Times was informed yesterday afternoon that Walters' life was insured and that the
insurance money was paid, on the evidence elicited in
the Hillmon trial, of his death.
If the defendants wished to induce members of the Walters
family to testify (as they did) about correspondence from
Frederick Adolph that mentioned the name Hillmon, what
better method of compensating them for their trouble than
retrospectively issuing a policy of insurance on his life, then
paying the proceeds to his bereaved family-a gesture splendidly in synchrony with their insistence that he had died at
Crooked Creek? But beyond pecuniary motives, I credit that
the Walters family did truly come to believe that the photographs of the dead man were those of their lost son and
brother Frederick Walters. A little suggestion and an adroit
presentation of the photos of the corpse would go a long way
toward persuading a baffled and worried family, whose loved
one had suddenly ceased writing, that his death at the hands
of the murderer John Hillmon was the explanation. If they
believed this much, they would also have believed that John
Hillmon was in hiding, waiting to enjoy the proceeds of his
crime. Their conviction that Frederick Adolph had died at
Crooked Creek may have nudged the family (as well as
Alvina Kasten) toward participation in perjury, if they thought
it would produce justice for their missing loved one.
Alvina Kasten's deposition was taken in June of 1881,
a year before the first trial, in her hometown of Ft. Madison.
It is this deposition that served thereafter as the defendant's
evidence concerning the famous letter. In it, she identifies an
exhibit as a letter beginning "Dearest Alvina" received by her
on March 3, 1879; she says she recognizes the handwriting as
that of her fiance F.A. Walters, from whom she testified she
had received a letter every two weeks, or week and a half,
since his departure from Ft. Madison nearly a year earlier. The
letter contains the familiar description of his encounter with
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"a man by the name of Hillmon who intends to start a sheep
range" and his intention to accept the man's offer of employment at "more wages than I could make at anything else."
Kasten testified that she had given this letter to Tillinghast,
New York Life Insurance Co.'s representative, in January
1880. (What of the other 25 or so letters she had received from
her swain? She claimed in the deposition that she had
destroyed them because she "was sick at the time and
did not expect to get over my sickness and destroyed all
my letters.")
What might have been Alvina Kasten's motives for lying
under oath? If threats or inducements prompted her deposition testimony identifying the letter, they are not evident from
the record. Still, her account of her relationship with Adolph,
as she said she called him, suggests some modest pride in her
betrothed status. Perhaps it would have been hard for her to
acknowledge that her fianc6 simply had chosen not to come
home to her and to stop writing; his death at the hands of
Hillmon may have been a less painful explanation for his
disappearance, not to mention one that would spare her
public humiliation. And once recruited to this theory, perhaps
she (like the Walters family) was easily enlisted in denying
the wicked Hillmons the proceeds of their crime, in her case
by agreeing to say that a letter she was given by the lawyers
had actually been received by her in the post shortly after the
date shown on it. She may have been persuaded that the letter
was intended for her and had somehow gone astray, and told
that it would benefit the Hillmons were she to say truthfully
how it had come to her. She may also have been promised that
she needed only to testify at a deposition and would never
have to appear before a judge (as a resident of Iowa she was
not susceptible to a subpoena to appear in federal court in

What would have
induced a respectable
woman and various
family members to
perjure themselves?
Kansas). She may even have been offered assurances similar
to those John Brown said he was offered-that his affidavit
would never be used in court and employed only to persuade
Sallie Hillmon to abandon her claim. We know that Kasten
never did appear in court, which prompts the question, why
not? Would it not have behooved the defendants (who brought
in many witnesses from much further away than Iowa) to
persuade the bereaved fianc6e to travel to the trial? Yet they
did not do so.
But how would the companies have persuaded young
Walters to write the famous letter? We know that the companies' agents had learned from his family that he had stopped
writing to them at about the time of the death at Crooked
Creek. If they found him shortly after that time working for
Simmons's cigar factory in Leavenworth and explained their
interest to him, would not Walters then have written home,
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and by this act relieved the sorrow of those who loved him and
mourned his supposed demise? If he was the young man
described by Arthur Simmons, an adventurer and traveler and
a bit of a rake with a tiresome fiancre back home, maybe not.
Perhaps he would have preferred to remain lost, especially if
the insurance companies that had placed so much stock in his
death were eager to subsidize his adventures away from
home. And if this deal were struck, what would have been
more sensible than for one of the companies' agents (my
money would be on Buchan) to require that Walters, for his
part, write a letter, its contents partly dictated, to someone
back home? The letter penned by Walters could then serve as
evidence for the companies' propositions about the corpse at
Crooked Creek. In such a case, the handwriting similarity
between the "Dearest Alvina" letter and the letters known to
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have been written by Walters would be no coincidence or
forgery; they would indeed have been written by the same
hand. And the mystery of why F.A. Walters, if he were still
alive, had not turned up in so many years would be solved.
Of course the letter to Alvina Kasten, having been created
some time after the inquest, would have required a Wichita
postmark of a date some months preceding the insurance
companies' involvement. Unfortunately the original cannot
be examined; both the letter and the envelope were made
exhibits to the Kasten deposition and spent many of the years
between Alvina Kasten's 1880 deposition and the later trials
in the safekeeping of a lawyer for the insurance companies,
after he supplied the record with a substitute copy. This copy,
having been made before the advent of copying machines,
was written by hand; the original is missing from the court's
archive. The copy that remains available for inspection represents that the original was postmarked "Wichita-Mar 2,
1879." But nineteenth-century American postmarks, or
cancellations, were neither distinctive nor uniform. Forging
one would not have been much of a challenge, and there is no
suggestion that any of Sallie Hillmon's lawyers scrutinized
the mark or the letter with any suspicion.
As for Sallie Hillmon, by the time the case was over, she
retained none of the settlement proceeds; before the last trial
she had assigned her interest in them to other parties. Perhaps
by then the decision whether to continue her exhausting quest
for affirmation that her husband was no murderer was not hers
at all. But of her we do know this one thing: Years earlier,
before the Supreme Court first heard the Hillmon case and
while there was still some prospect that she would collect the
policy proceeds, Sallie Hillmon remarried. It is possible that
an unschooled waitress in her 20s pulled off a devastating
double-cross of her first husband, knowing that he would
be compelled to remain hidden while she and her second
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husband enjoyed their bigamy and his life insurance proceeds.
But isn't it far more likely that she always knew the truth of
what she had claimed from the first moment she viewed the
body that had been brought to Lawrence from Crooked
Creek-that John Hillmon was dead?
One proponent of narrative legal theory quotes the maxim
da mihifacta,dabo tibijus ("give me the facts, then I will give
you the law"), and several scholars have remarked upon the
inseparable character of the activities of lawmaking and factfinding (or storytelling). I have suggested that the legal rule
propounded by the Court in the Hillmon case was created
because the only story the Court could bring itself to endorse
demanded it. And I have undertaken to persuade my readers
that this story was untrue.
Of course, I cannot claim to be immune myself from the
seductions of narrative. I have here only told another story,
albeit one that I believe to be better justified by the evidence
than the historical version. I have tried in telling my version
to lash myself to the mast of truth, but I confess I've enjoyed
telling what I believe to be an excellent tale, and possibly its
siren call has deceived me as well.
But what if I am right? What if the letter from Frederick
Adolph Walters to Alvina Kasten was written not when it was
dated and postmarked but later, and not because the writer
really wished to inform Kasten of his whereabouts and plans,
but because some agent of the three insurance companies manufactured this evidence with the assistance of Walters, who was
paid for his contribution? At the very least, if we are persuaded
of this proposition, we might be able to look at the exception to
the hearsay rule for statements of intention with an eye less
deceived by the MacGuffin that has always bound this fragment of legal doctrine to a charming but mendacious story.
Recent Supreme Court discussions about other hearsay
exceptions have cast a severely critical eye on proponents'
easy claims about the inherent credibility of certain categories
of extrajudicial statement. Suppose this renewed skepticism
were applied to statements of a declarant's intentions, as
exemplified by the Walters letter. Those I have persuaded
about the letter's origins must look soberly at the statements
of Frederick Adolph Walters in the letter to his dearest Alvina,
for if I am correct, it is full of falsehoods, from the implicit
assertion contained in the date at the top ("Today is March 1,
1879"); to its assurance to Kasten that "I am about as Anxious
to see you as you are to see me"; to its recitation of the writer's
intentions to look for a place to start a sheep ranch with John
Hillmon, who had promised him "more wages than I could
make at anything else." One might respond that a single
counterexample does not unmake the wisdom of a general
rule, but at least the wisdom of the rule must be defended
without reference to that particular example. This enterprise is
one that the law of evidence, in the 112 years post-Hillmon,
has not seriously undertaken.
But even if they do not prompt revision of the law of
evidence, these investigations may serve to illustrate the
powerful and often unacknowledged contribution of the
narrative imperative-the need to construct an acceptable
story-to the creation of law. Judges may not think of themselves as storytellers, but this role is not easily abandoned
even when disclaimed. Perhaps the maxim da mihifacta,
dabo tibijus undervalues the other determinants of commonlaw decision making, but it is a rare narrator who is willing to
throw the MacGuffin overboard. I
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